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Abstract Drawing on surveys of religion and values in Great
Britain, this paper suggests that Peter Berger’s paradigm of
two pluralisms can be usefully supplemented by taking ac-
count of a third kind of intensified pluralism. This involves
the breakdown of the boundaries between religions, and be-
tween the religious and the secular, and is therefore a pluralism
of de-differentiation. It helps explain many features of con-
temporary religion and identity, including the rise of the
Bnones^ and the increasing reluctance of each new generation
to identify with religious (and secular) labels and packages.
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Peter Berger’s two pluralisms offer us a useful new para-
digm for understanding religion in the modern world.
First, there is religious pluralism; second, the pluralism
of religious and secular coexistence. Because these two
kinds of diversity now exist together in most societies,
criss-crossing one another, they result in an overall inten-
sification of pluralism, not least in the individual mind
(Berger 2014).
Here I want to suggest that this paradigm can be extended
and made even more powerful by paying attention to a third
kind of pluralism which has close connections with the first
two, but goes beyond them. This is a pluralism of religious de-
differentiation, closely tied up with a wider de-differentiation
of previously more separate social domains, which many
countries including Britain and the United States are
experiencing today, and which in religious terms is signalized
by the growing number of those reporting Bno religion^ – the
so-called Bnones^.
I came to realise the value of such an extension of the
Berger paradigm in trying to make sense of several extensive
surveys of the values and beliefs of the British which I carried
out with the survey company YouGov in 2013 and 2014,1 and
I will focus on the example of Britain (Scotland, England and
Wales, but not Northern Ireland).
Britain is, as Berger would predict, plural in cultural
and religious terms – even more so than the USA – and
it also has a pluralism of the religious and the secular, de
facto if not de jure. This is clear. But my surveys reveal
an even deeper kind of pluralism, since a growing propor-
tion of British people now refuse to categorise themselves
as either religious or secular, and display notably variegat-
ed beliefs which are impossible to fit into neat religious or
secular schemas. Combining this evidence with recent
qualitiative studies makes it clear that the situation cannot
wholly be accounted for by the fact that people are not
neccesarily neatly religious in one compartment of social
life (e.g., at home) and secular in another (e.g., at work).
Nor do more than a tiny number identify with more than
one religious tradition (like Christian and Hindu, or Quak-
er and Catholic). They are plural in a different sense.
1 Two population surveys were carried out in January and June 2013.
They are representative of adults aged 18+ in Great Britain excluding
Northern Ireland. They were supplemented by a third survey completed
by a nationally-representative sample of 1062 Catholics. The research
was funded by two of the UK’s research councils, designed by
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Catholics
Let me take Roman Catholics in Britain as an example, be-
cause they are in many ways the least likely pluralists. Not
only does their tradition offer clear, centralised moral and
dogmatic instruction, but they are a religious minority in Brit-
ain, with a long history of sporadic persecution and disadvan-
tage, especially relative to the majority church, the Church of
England. As such, they can be expected to have a relatively
strong and rather homogenous identity, built around what
Steve Bruce calls Bcultural defence^.
Self-identified Catholics today constitute about 10% of the
population of Great Britain.2 The largest Christian denomina-
tion, Anglican, currently represents around 30 % of the pop-
ulation, but is declining fast. Although the proportion of Cath-
olics is more stable, partly because of immigration, their pro-
file is nevertheless very unlike that which their Church
leaders, or the traditional categories of religious scholarship
religion, would expect. Indeed, if we measure Catholics by
their conformity to some of the key beliefs and behaviours
laid down by the Catholic magisterium –weekly churchgoing,
certain belief in God, looking to ecclesiastical and scriptural
sources for authority, opposition to abortion, same-sex mar-
riage and euthanasia – only 5 % of Catholics qualify as
Bfaithful^ or orthodox, and a mere 2 % of Catholics aged
under 30 (in Britain at least it is a myth that younger Catholics
are on the whole more orthodox than their elders).
Nor do a majority of Catholics label themselves
Breligious.^ Only a fifth describe themselves as such, a tenth
as Bspiritual,^ and another fifth as Bboth.^ The greatest pro-
portion, one third, say BI would not describe myself, or my
values and beliefs, as spiritual or religious.^ Overall, a quarter
of self-identified Catholics do not believe in God, and over
half do not go to church. A majority do not identify as either
Breligious^ or Bspiritual^, when presented with a range of
other options. A third say that they practice no spiritual activ-
ity in private. And, rather delightfully, one in five self-
identified Catholics report that they are Bnot influenced by
any religion at all^.
The official Catholic Church would, and regularly does,
say that this shows that Catholics need better instruction and
discipline. Older paradigms in the study of religion say that
they are gradually secularising. Both are asserting that Catho-
lics have departed from the norm of what these authorities
consider to be Breal religion^, but my surveys show that nei-
ther offers an adequate explanation.
For one thing, belief in God remains high amongst Catho-
lics. Virtually all churchgoing Catholics believe in God, as do
70 % of self-identified Catholics taken as a whole.3 Catholics
also report a rather high level of personal spiritual practice.
Moreover, when asked about their activities over the last
month, over 40 % say that they have prayed, a fifth that they
have visited places which feel sacred or holy, the same number
that they have taken regular time to be alone and still the mind,
and 8 % that they have meditated. More than one in ten ad-
herent Catholics read sacred and spiritual writings on amonth-
ly basis, and the same number report Bfeeling a deep connec-
tion with nature/the earth.^
So most Catholics have not simply been secularising –
abandoning faith in something Bbeyond^, to use Berger’s use-
ful definition of religion – altogether. What they seem to have
fallen out of love with is Breligion^ and their Church. As Clive
Field (2014) has argued with regard to Britain, and Mark
Chaves (1994) with regard to the USA, this is a crisis of
religious authority more than one of religion. My surveys find
that a full 96 % of self-identified Catholics say they take no
authority at all from their religious leaders, local or otherwise.
They may respect or admire them, but they don’t do what they
say. Similarly, the practice of churchgoing has fallen away
amongst younger Catholics: 1 in 3 over-60s attend weekly,
but only 1 in 8 of those under 60. And only 36 % of Catholics
say that they view the Catholic Church as a positive force in
society.4
In other words, a growing proportion of Catholics, espe-
cially younger generations, retain the Catholic label and some
elements of religiosity, but have distanced themselves from
Catholicism as an authoritative Bpackage^, and an off-the-
shelf religious identity.
BNon-religious^ Britain
Standing back to look at Britain as a whole, it is clear that
what we find amongst Catholics is not atypical. Neither
the categories of denominational and religious identifica-
tion (e.g., Christian, Hindu, Catholic), nor those of reli-
gious or secular, signify in the way they once did. A
greater pluralism seems to have overwhelmed them, and
rendered them much less useful than they once were.
The single most important, indeed epoch-making, fact
about religion in Britain today is that the proportion of people
identifying as having Bno religion^ is set to equal or overtake
that of BChristians^ within a few decades. Indeed, as Table 1
shows, if religions other than Christianity are taken out of the
2 My surveys can distinguish between different kinds of Catholics, in-
cluding churchgoers and non-churchgoers. In what follows I am referring
to all self-identified Catholics, unless otherwise indicated. Churchgoers
are not as distinct from their non-churchgoing brethren as might be imag-
ined. See Woodhead (2013a, b).
3 As Berger would predict, however, they believe with less certainty: a
third of Catholics in their 20s say there is Bdefinitely^ a God, compared
with 57 % of over-60s.
4 When those who take an actively negative view of the Church are asked
their reasons, the most popular are: that the Church discriminates against
women and gay people, because of the child abuse scandals, because it is
hypocritical, and because it is too morally conservative.
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picture, Bnone^ has already become the majority identity for
British people under 50. According tomy surveys, 38% of the
population now report having Bno religion^, and the propor-
tion grows to nearly half of young adults aged under 30, of
whom only about a quarter identify with any Christian denom-
ination. 5 Amongst those over 60 the situation is more than
reversed, with 27% having Bno religion^ and 58% a Christian
affiliation.6
However, a really crucial point is that Bno-religion^ does not
simply equate to Bsecular^ and Batheist^. Whilst only 16 % of
nones believe in God, most are indifferent about the issue of
God’s existence, rather than certain about BHis^ non-existence.
Similarly, just 7 % of the population say they are influenced by
humanism or secularism, and, as Table 2 shows, when people
are given an additional option besides the conventional
Breligious, spiritual, both, none^, a plurality opt to take it. The
idea that the British are uniformly drifting towards a thorough-
going atheism resembling that of Richard Dawkins, is false.
Only a small proportion of those who report having no reli-
gion are actively hostile to religion. I identified such Bhostile
nones^ as those who say they have no religion, are atheist, and
agree that both the Church of England and the Roman Catholic
Church are each a negative force in society. They amount to just
13 % of nones, and 5 % of the population. These Bsecularists^
are disproportionately male, and are just as likely to be found
amongst older as younger generations. They do not appear to be
growing anything like as fast as the unaffiliated Bnones^, and
there are no more of them in younger than older generations.
Moroever, indifference to Breligion^ is not unique to Bnones.^
It is shared by a significant number of people who identify as
Jewish, Christian, Buddhist etc. In total, only 47 % of those who
report a religious affiliation describe themselves as religious and/
or spiritual, and over a quarter say they are not influenced by
religion. Equally, there are sizeable numbers of religiously-
affiliated people who are atheists and agnostics – 63 % of those
who identify as Buddhist, 42 % of those who state their religion
as Jewish, 33 % of all Christians, 11 % of Muslims.7
All Shook Up
Clearly old categories for understanding pluralism don’t seem
to be working very well. Most people can’t easily be catego-
rized as Christian, Buddhist, Jewish or whatever. Even if they
tick that box on a survey, they defy the norms of what Chris-
tians (or Catholics), Jews, or Buddhists are meant to be like.
They may believe in God, but say they are not religious; they
may say they are Catholic but not believe in God; they may
say they are Jewish but not influenced by religion – and so on.
Berger (2014) has a good explanation for this messiness.
He reminds us that people are not consistent. They are differ-
ent in different social contexts, and modern people live in
highly differentiated societies. So someone may be very
secular when she is at work as a surgeon performing an
operation, but very religious when she is at home lighting
Shabbat candles. As Nancy Ammerman (2014) points out in
a response, however, many people in the USA these days
seem to be complexly, pluralistically, religious and secular
even when they are within a single institutional domain. So
the surgeon may say a prayer when she gets to a tricky part of
an operation, and may be thinking about something decidedly
secular when she lights the candles. Qualitative research
shows this better than qualitative. And the evidence is mount-
ing up. People don’t fit the categories which the state, reli-
gious leaders, and many academics continue to use.
Ammerman points out that a lot of the stories they tell about
themselves aren’t clearly religious or secular either – the cat-
egories just don’t fit very well.
My surveys point to the same blurring of boundaries. More
and more British as well as US people are Bnon-religious^, but
this does not mean they are secular. BNon-religion^ is not
really an identity category at all, it’s an artefact of pre-existing,
modern survey categories – a pollster’s clumsy recognition
that the standard categories of Christian, Muslim, Buddhist
5 The 2012 British Social Attitudes Survey (n= 3248) reports 48 % say-
ing Bno religion^, and the 2011 Census for England andWales 25%. The
variation may be partly explained by the fact the Census may be filled in
by the head of household on behalf of children and by the form of the
question. Fewer people seem to opt for Bno religion^ when given the
option of BChristian^, as on the Census. More report Bno religion^ when
the option is BCofE^, BCatholic^, BBaptist^ etc., as on the BSA survey
and my YouGov surveys.
6 the balance of people either do not wish to state, or state their religion as
Bother^ or a non-Christian faith.














18–19 55 % 20 % 25 % 73 %
20s 47 % 26 % 27 % 65 %
30s 44 % 28 % 28 % 61 %
40s 41 % 40 % 19 % 51 %
50s 36 % 47 % 17 % 43 %
60s 29 % 56 % 15 % 34 %
70s 21 % 62 % 17 % 26 %
80s 14 % 64 % 22 % 17 %
Total 38 % 41 % 21 % 48 %
7 BNones^ are more liberal than the rest of the population in their attitudes
to personal morality, and there is a clear age effect with young people
being in general more liberal. For example, among those under 50, nones
believe that gay marriage is right by a margin of 59 %; the rest of the
population is also in favour, but by the much narrower margin of 10 %.
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have ceased to be relevant to an increasing number of people.
And even those who can still tick the old religious boxes don’t
necessarily behave or believe in the way they are expected to.
The categories of Bnones^ and Bnon-religion^ are chiefly im-
portant as a sign that the old classifications are breaking down.
My suggestion is that we are seeing the arrival of a third,
intensified, kind of pluralism: a pluralism of religious de-
differentiation and deregulation.
The Pluralism of De-differentiation
This third kind of religious pluralism is evident at the level of
individual lives, and has a social-structural correlate in the de-
differentiation of functions and sectors of post-industrial soci-
eties. Functional differentiation is, of course, a particular his-
torical episode, associated with industrial modernity and the
modern secular state. It is under pressure from under various
late modern pressures, including the realisation that the ‘wick-
ed problems’ facing the world today – from climate change to
obesity – cross many different social domains, and require
connected responses. This situation has important implica-
tions for religious pluralism.
Social differentiation did not just undermine religion, re-
ducing its public sway, it also changed it. As Casanova (1994)
argued so influentially, the most reliable insight of modern
secularisation theories was that the differentiation of western
societies denuded religion of its previous extension across
society and stripped away many of its roles. It consolidated
a more specialised and purely Breligious^ sector, with a dis-
crete set of activities, and clear boundaries. This process was
reinforced by the growth of modern colonial and colonial-
national secular states. It was cemented by religious elites
themselves, who evolved into more professionalised religious
functionaries working within bureaucratic forms of religious
structure, with clear roles and rewards and, often, state-recog-
nition. In Britain this was all played out in relation to the
historic religions and denominations, such as the Roman
Catholic, Anglican, ‘Free’ Protestant, and Jewish. As clergy
tookmore power to themselves, the role of laity (often female)
in both governance and voluntary activity diminished accord-
ingly (Brown and Woodhead 2016).
Both nationally and globally, this process tended to reify
the existence and power of a small, authorised set of Bworld
religions^, and denominations within them. They were
characterised by some combination of a male leadership and
clear teachings, practices and boundaries of orthodoxy or
orthopraxy. State bureaucracy encouraged this process, which
made classification, representation, enumeration, communica-
tion and control easier. There is a colonial and then a post-
colonial phase to this process.
Recent intensified globalisation both strengthens and
weakens such religious reification. It strengthens because re-
ligions respond by strengthening internal transnational links,
sharpening their global ‘brand’, consolidating themselves in
relation to transnational political and other arrangements, and
defining themselves in relation to one another (Beyer 2006).
But there are also powerful countervailing, ‘de-differentiating’
forces at work in late modernity.
One of the most important acids of the modern religious
settlement is growing affluence worldwide, the creation of a
global middle class, and expanding individual expectation of
Bvoice and choice^. The latter, supported by both democracy
and consumer capitalism, is starkest in relation to women’s
often dramatically improved status and power, but evident
more widely. At the same time, there is a massive expansion
of education and a startling deregulation of information, both
aided by the internet and the digital revolution. This under-
mines the virtual monopoly of religious knowledge and prac-
tice which religious professionals were able to consolidate in
the modern era. Religious ideas and symbols float free on a
scale never seen before, becoming available to any Bseeker^,
whilst social-networking media make it much easier to estab-
lish new religious networks and groupings whether real, vir-
tual or both. These interlinked processes undermine the
established entitlements of state-recognised religious leaders,
and the bureaucratic and bounded forms of religious organi-
sation on which their power rests become something of a
liability as flexibility and meaningful lay participation become
more essential to success.
So on the one hand, Bmodern^ religious authorities lose
their ability to police their own boundaries and maintain con-
trol and purity, whilst on the other hand, ordinary people feel
new entitlements in relation to religion, as in other areas of
their lives, and wish to think and choose for themselves rather
Table 2 Spiritual, religious,
other Which, if any, of the following best describes you? Nones All
A spiritual person 12 % 15 %
A religious person 1 % 8 %
Both spiritual and religious 1 % 10 %
I would not describe myself, or my values and beliefs, as spiritual or religious 67 % 48 %
None of these 17 % 13 %
Dont know 3 % 6 %
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than merely obey and be dutiful. In Britain, for example, my
surveys of views on a range of ethical issues reveal that the
overwhelming majority of the population (over 90 %) are
liberal in terms of their commitment to individual choice rath-
er than some other authority, and that most say that they rely
on their own judgement and conscience to make important
decisions (whether or not this is true in reality, this is their
favoured perception). Not surprisingly, many such liberals
are critical of what they see as the authoritarianism of
established forms of religion. Some abandon it altogether, a
few become actively hostile, others actively seek, find and
create spiritual alternatives. But most draw on select elements
of religion which they still find meaningful (e.g., life-course
rituals, various symbols and narratives), abandon other ele-
ments (e.g., membership and regular churchgoing), and meld
them all together with a wide range of other sources of
significance.
This is what I mean by the new, intensified form of de-
differentiated religious pluralism. It accounts for the fact that
such a large and growing number of people now think of
themselves as having Bno religion^, for by this they mean
the Bpackaged^, Bdogmatic^ religions of modern societies.
They are rejecting something very particular, not necessarily
the much broader phenonomenon of religion, or all aspcts of
it, or ways it may be recreated. They do not necessarily be-
come atheists, or abandon the belief that there are things be-
yond this life which give it meaning. Most do not abandon all
aspects of their inherited religions to become neatly and hy-
gienically secular, and they are not usually neatly religious in
some domains of their life and secular in others. Nor do they
resort to some sort of untrammelled Bpick and mix^ approach
to religion: they are limited in what they Bpick^ by the reli-
gions with which they have had contact, and by the normal
constraints of ethnicity, class, education, and the knowledge
and networks to which they give access.
Importantly, people are decreasingly likely to think or act in
terms of a neatly differentiated religious realm – such as that
so well signified during the modern period by churchgoing on
a Sunday morning. They are increasingly likely to engage
with spiritual meaning across the various compartments of
their life, and not merely in private. Consider, for example,
how mindfulness meditation is now practised in healthcare
settings, workplaces and so on, or in which spiritual and moral
development is integral schooling in Britain.
Far from being corrosive of religion per se, this de-
differentiating and increasingly de-regulated situation pro-
vides enormous opportunities for the new – and old – religious
providers and entrepreneurs who are able to take advantage of
it. Bewildering numbers set up stall in the new religious mar-
ket place, offering an enormous variety of Bproducts^ for var-
ious niches. Many still draw on the existing Bworld^ religious
traditions, indeed some claim to be their uniquely faithful
representatives – religious fundamentalists being a good
example. Others at the opposite end of the spectrum rework
or self-consciously invent new religions for a post-modern
clientele (Cusack 2010). The entire charismatic upsurge, and
much of what is happening to Islam, can be helpfully under-
stood in this simultaneously differentiated and de-
differentiating context, in which market forces become as im-
portant as state ones. Charismatic forms of authority find new
opportunities as traditional and bureaucratic forms of leader-
ship, both religious and secular, struggle to command respect.
The forms of religion which are growing fastest in the world
have in common the fact that they are fantastically
disorganised, allow considerable lay participation, blur the
lay-clerical boundary, are entrepreneurial, experiment with
new, often charismatic, forms of authority, and are often rather
institutionally-fragile and short-lived.
In this context, the old religions of modernity live on, des-
perately trying to shore up their defences and find new oppor-
tunities. Many try to sharpen their boundaries with clear state-
ments of belief, strictness in moral teaching, and so on. Hav-
ing a charismatic leader, like Pope Francis, may help, but will
not guarantee obedience or faithful allegiance. Nevertheless,
such religion continues to be supported by the fact that states,
and international governing alliances, still recognise, register
and otherwise legitimate these old forms of religion and their
leaders (as do many voluntary organisations, as well as civil-
society initiaitves like Binter-faith dialogue^). So at the macro-
level in particular the differentiated, modern, religious order
continues, even though at the meso- and micro-level it is in-
creasingly hollowed-out and Bpolluted^.
I believe that many late-modern societies, including
Britain and the USA, are thus in a transitional phase at
the moment, in which the differentiated modern mode of
religion persists alongside new de-differentiated, prolifer-
ating alternatives. Because the former is much more
threatened by the latter than vice versa, one of its main
defensive strategies is to deny that new forms of religion
count as religion at all. Some academics take the same
approach. But those involved in the new forms of
Breligion^ are generally untroubled by having the label
denied them. The growing association of religion with
violence, reinforced by Islamic terrorism, only strengthens
their desire to distance themselves from the toxic brand
which is religion. A few prefer the word Bspirituality ,^ but
a growing number simply identify as having Bno
religion^, without necessarily losing interest or involve-
ment in many aspects of what religion can provide.
The fact that we are in transition is revealed by the
generational split in religious identification. The old cate-
gories of religious belonging remain relevant to those aged
60 and above (a majority of whom are Christian in Britain),
but are increasingly less applicable to younger cohorts.
Even those who still accept these labels, particularly in
the middle age cohorts, fill them with a much more mixed
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content than religious and political leaders would like.
Meanwhile, the old-style modern religions, most notably
the churches, often become increasingly clerical and au-
thoritarian. It is a mutually-reinforcing dynamic: the top-
down tendency to purify fights against countervailing
trends of de-differentiation and mixing from bottom-up.
None of this is completely new. Historians have taught us
that even in medieval Catholic Europe ordinary people might
hold or develop idiosyncratic and far-from-orthodox versions
of religion. Some religions, like Hinduism, were always more
resistant to systematisation and rationalization. What late,
globalized, modernity does is to make the process of democ-
ratized reinvention and plundering much easier and less costly
by on the one hand unlocking religious resources, and on the
other hand undermining the power of traditional religious au-
thorities to control them. This greatly enhances the capacity of
ordinary believers to Bdo religion^ for themselves, and a cul-
ture which privileges individual voice and choice only makes
this seem more desirable.
The Blurring of the Religious and Secular
Berger’s paradigm of twin pluralisms offers an extremely use-
ful tool for making sense of religion in the modern world. The
lens of religious pluralism helps us see how different religious
traditions co-exist and relate within a given society, and what
this means for their plausibility. It becomes more powerful
when taken together with the lens of religious-secular plural-
ism. This not only helps us differentiate between various na-
tional state regimes in terms of their self-understandings, pro-
tocols, and modes of governance of religion, it also helps us
look at different sectors of society – e.g., schools, hospitals –
their self-representations, relations with religion, and so on.
Both forms of pluralism are bound up with modern function-
ally differentiated societies, and with the modern nation states
so central to them. They have been intensified by the flows of
globalization, and its compression of space and time. Using
both lenses, we understand much more about how individual
lives are affected by pluralism.
Increasingly, this twin pluralism is joined by a new form of
pluralism characteristic of post-industrial, affluent, highly-ed-
ucated, late modern societies. It is bound up not with differ-
entiation but with de-differentiation, and is a pluralism which
has to do not just with clearly demarcated social functions and
domains and their religious or secular profiles, but the break-
down of clear boundaries between them. Religion has leaked
into areas of life from which it was temporarily exiled by
modern projects; the religious-secular distinction becomes
blurred or meaningless; the category of religion becomes tox-
ic; the reality of religion as a separate domain of socio-
political life wanes; religious professionals lose status and
authority; people become their own priest. Increasing numbers
of us inhabit the complex intersections between these three
kinds of pluralism, as the old religious order is overtaken by
something new.
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